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Duckworth v. Eagan: A Little-Noticed 
Miranda Case That May Cause Much 
Mischief 
By Yale Kamisar* 
Professor Yale Kamisar, the country's foremost scholar of 
Miranda and police interrogation, presents an analysis and critique 
of the Supreme Court's latest interpretation of Miranda. In Duck-
worth, a 5-4 Court upheld the "if and when" language systemati-
cally used by the Hammond, Indiana, Police Department: "We 
have no way of giving you a lawyer, but one will be appointed for 
you, if you wish, if and when you go to court." 
The real issue was whether the police effectively conveyed the 
substance of a vital part of Miranda: the right to have a lawyer 
appointed prior to any questioning. Professor Kamisar argues that 
the language upheld is unnecessarily confusing and misleading and 
that the best explanation for the Hammond police's continued use 
of this language is that it lessens the likelihood of an assertion of 
rights. 
Duckworth v. Eagan, 1 the only significant Miranda decision 
the United States Supreme Court handed down during its 1988-
1989 term, has gone largely unnoticed. It is not hard to un-
derstand why. 
The opinion was announced the same day the Court decided 
two death penalty cases the press considered much more news-
worthy.2 Moreover, Duckworth was decided only five days after 
the Court overturned Gregory Johnson's flag-burning con-
viction3-and at a time when most of the country was still in 
white heat over that event. Finally, Chief Justice Rehnquist, 
who wrote the opinion of the Court in Duckworth, gave the im-
* Henry K. Ransom Professor of Law at the University of Michigan Law School; 
author, Police Interrogation and Confessions: Essays in Law and Policy (1980). An 
earlier and shorter version of this commentary appeared without footnotes in Legal 
Times, July 24, 1989 at p. 25. 
1 109 S. Ct. 2875 (1989). Chief Justice Rehnquist spoke for a 5-4 majority (Mar-
shall, joined by Brennan, Blackmun and Stevens, JJ., dissenting). 
2 See Penry v. Lynaugh, 109 S. Ct. 2934 (1989). (Eighth Amendment does not 
categorically forbid execution of the mentally retarded); Stanford v. Kentucky, 109 
S. Ct. 2969 (1989) (state may execute 16- and 17-year-old offenders). 
' 3 Texas v. Johnson, 109 S. Ct. 2533 (1989). 
550 
DUCKWORTH v. EAGAN 
pression that the case was relatively unimportant and the result 
reached quite predictable. 
Most journalists completely overlooked Duckworth. The 
few who gave it some coverage treated the case much as its 
author seemed to regard it-both as an insignificant case 
reaffirming the view that "the 'rigidity' of Miranda warnings 
[does not] extend to the precise formulation of the warnings 
given a criminal defendant,' '4 and as a case upholding the warn-
ings, although they were not "in the exact form" described in 
the Miranda opinion, because "in their totality" they satisfied 
Miranda. 5 
Duckworth is, in fact, a much more significant and trouble-
some case than its neglect by the press suggests and a majority 
of the Court would have us believe. The issue presented was 
not whether a "talismanic incantation" of the Miranda warn-
ings is required.6 Of course it is not. 7 Rather, it was whether the 
substance of an important feature of the Miranda warnings-
4 109 S. Ct. at 2879, (quoting California v. Prysock, 453 U.S. 355, 359 (1981) (per 
curiam), discussed in note 12 infra). 
5 109 S. Ct. 2879, 2881. 
6 The Duckworth majority recalled that the Court pointed out in California v. 
Prysock (discussed in note 12 infra) that "no talismanic incantation [of the Miranda 
warnings is] required to satisfy its strictures." /d. at 2879. 
7 Although it is sometimes said that every schoolboy knows the Miranda warn-
ings by now, it is perhaps more accurate to say that, although many schoolboys are 
familiar with the first part of the Miranda warnings (just as they are familiar with the 
first stanza of the "Star Spangled Banner"), a good number of schoolboys and adults 
do not have a firm grasp of all four elements or subwarnings. They are: 
1. You have the right to remain silent; 
2. Anything you say can and will be used [or simply "can be used" or "may be 
used"] against you; 
3. You have the right to talk to a lawyer and to have him present with you while 
you are being questioned [or "you have the right to talk to a lawyer before you 
are questioned" or "you have a right to talk to a lawyer before we ask you any 
questions, and to have him with you during the questioning"]; and 
4. If you cannot afford a lawyer, one will be appointed for you before any 
questioning if you so desire [or "if you cannot afford a lawyer, one will be 
provided for you prior to any interrogation" or "if you cannot afford a lawyer, 
and you want one, we will see that you have one provided to you free of charge 
[without charge] before we ask you any questions"]. 
As the bracketed variations indicate, the warnings need not be given in the exact 
form described in the Miranda opinion. Indeed, the warnings are not described ex-
actly the same way throughout the opinion. But while there is some room for varia-
tion in the warnings, as long as the substance of each warning is given effectively, the 
range of variation permitted is (or at least used to be) rather narrow. 
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the right to have a lawyer appointed prior to any questioning-
was ever effectively conveyed to the defendant. A reading of 
the majority opinion leaves one with the conviction that the 
Court dealt Miranda a heavy blow. 
Did the Warnings Satisfy Miranda? 
When respondent Eagan agreed to go to Hammond, In-
diana, police headquarters for questioning about his possible 
involvement in a murder, a station-house officer read a waiver 
form that departed from the standard Miranda warnings. The 
form provided, inter alia: 
You have a right to talk to a lawyer for advice before we ask you any 
questions, and have him with you during questioning. You have the right 
to the advice and presence of a lawyer even if you cannot afford to hire 
one. We have no way of giving you a lawyer, but one will be appointed 
for you, if you wish, if and when you go to court. If you wish to answer 
questions now without a lawyer present, you have the right to stop an-
swering questions at any time. You also have the right to stop answering 
at any time until you've talked to a lawyer. 8 
In 1972, the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit had 
disapproved a virtually identical Miranda warning, finding it 
"misleading," "confusing," and "contradictory. " 9 When, in 
1987, the Duckworth case came before it on federal habeas cor-
pus, the court of appeals saw no reason to stray from its earlier 
analysis: "The 'internal inconsistencies' inherent in this type of 
warning are no less ambiguous and misleading than they were 
fifteen years ago. " 10 
When the Duckworth case reached the Supreme Court, 
however, a 5-4 majority, per Chief Justice Rehnquist, gave the 
challenged warning a more sympathetic reading. After dissect-
ing the language quoted above, the majority concluded that the 
warnings "touched all of the bases required by Miranda. " 11 
On the contrary, the warnings missed one base-and by a 
substantial margin. 12 According to Miranda, "if police propose 
8 ld. at 2877 (emphasis added by the Supreme Court). 
9 United States ex rei. Williams v. Twomey, 467 F.2d 1248, 1250. 
10 Duckworth v. Eagan, 843 F.2d 1554, 1557 (1987). 
11 109 S. Ct. at 2880. 
12 Although the Duckworth majority would have one believe that the result in that 
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to interrogate a person they must make known to him that he is 
entitled to a lawyer and that if he cannot afford one, a lawyer 
will be provided for him prior to any interrogation. " 13 But the 
police told Eagan, in effect, that if he could not afford a lawyer, 
one would not be-indeed, could not be-provided for him 
" prior to or during any questioning. 
To be sure, Eagan was told at the very outset that he had a 
right to talk to a lawyer before the police asked him any ques-
tions. But taking into account what he was told in the next 
breath, Eagan might plausibly have concluded that, since indi-
gent persons like him had no way of getting a lawyer at this 
stage, there was no point in asking for one. (Wasn't that what 
the police wanted him to think?) 
Eagan was also told, at the end of the reading of the waiver 
form, that he had "the right to stop answering questions at any 
time" until he talked to a lawyer. But that piece of advice was 
case follows easily from the decision in Prysock, the warnings upheld in that earlier 
case presented a much closer question. Respondent Prysock was informed that he 
had "the right to talk to a lawyer before you are questioned, have him present with 
you while you are being questioned, and all during the questioning." He was then 
told: "[You] have the right w have a lawyer appointed to represent you at no cost to 
yourself.'' 
It may not have been as clear to Pry sock as it should have been that he had a right 
to appointed counsel before and during questioning. Arguably, however, he could 
have reasonably concluded that the very explict and emphatic general advice about 
his right to a lawyer "before" and "while" and "all during the questioning" applied 
and was meant to apply to his right to have a lawyer appointed to represent him if he 
could not afford one. 
In Duckworth, however, the suspect was not left to wonder whether the general 
advice about the presence of counsel applied to his right to appointed counsel. There 
was no ambiguity about when a lawyer would first be available for him. He was told 
explicitly and emphatically that a lawyer would not be available in the station house, 
that one would not be appointed for him until he went to court, and that there was 
"no way" he could get a lawyer until then. See text at note 8 supra. 
Moreover, the police in the Prysock case arguably got into difficulty because, in 
addition to informing the suspect of his standard Miranda rights, they were trying to 
inform him, a minor, of his special rights, i.e., the right to have his parents present 
during the questioning (which they were). The logical time to advise a suspect of his 
right to be provided a lawyer free of charge before he is questioned is right after he 
has been given his general advice about counsel. But this is also a natural or logical 
time to tell a minor that he has the right to have his parents, as well as a lawyer, 
present. This is what occurred in Pry sock. At the very point one would have ex-
pected the police to inform defendant of his right to appointed counsel prior to and 
during questioning, they informed him, instead, of his special right as a minor to have 
his parents present before and during any questioning. Thus, it may be said, the 
police broke the normal flow of the Miranda warnings for good cause. 
13 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 474 (1966) (emphasis added). To the same 
effect, see id. at 473, 479. 
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colored by the information preceding it that implied there was 
no way Eagan would be able to talk to a lawyer during his stay 
in the police station; he would not get the oppportunity to talk 
to a lawyer until he went to court. 
Under the circumstances, Eagan might easily have con-
cluded that he would look silly asking the police to stop 
questioning him until he talked to a lawyer. The police would 
have wondered whether he had been listening to them. What 
was the point of asking the police for a lawyer now, when the 
police had just finished telling him there was no way he could 
get one at this time? After all, as the Duckworth dissenters 
pointed out, Eagan was never told, nor given any reason to be-
lieve, that if he wanted a lawyer appointed for him the question-
ing would be delayed until one was made available. 14 
Of course, if Eagan were a smart, sophisticated fellow, he 
might have dissected the Hammond police warning the way 
Chief Justice Rehnquist did and figured out that he could stop 
the questioning-indeed, prevent it from ever getting un-
derway-simply by asking for a lawyer, even though there was 
no way he could actually get one at the time. But the Miranda 
warnings weren't designed for smart, sophisticated people. 
(Such people probably don't need the Miranda warnings.) The 
warnings-at least the ones described in the Miranda opinion-
were constructed for not-so-smart, not very sophisticated peo-
ple. Such people need to be, and are supposed to be, "clearly 
inform[ed]" of their right to appointed counsel. 15 "Only by 
effective and express explanation to the indigent of this right 
can there be assurance that he was truly in a position to exercise 
it.'' 16 Eagan was given no such explanation. 
The Miranda warnings are designed to "dispel the compul-
sion inherent in custodial surroundings. " 17 How is that goal ad-
vanced by informing a suspect that ''we have no way of giving 
you a lawyer" before (or during) custodial interrogation? The 
Miranda warnings are supposed to assure an indigent that he, 
no less than a wealthy person, "has a right to have counsel 
14 See 109 S. Ct. at 2887 (Marshall, J., dissenting). 
15 384 U.S. at 471. 
16 Id. at 458 (emphasis added). 
17 Id. at 458. To the same effect, see id. at 465, 468. 
554 
DUCKWORTH v. EAGAN 
present. " 18 How is an indigent given that assurance by being 
told that if he cannot afford a lawyer there is no way to imple-
ment his right to have counsel present? 
"Anticipating" a Suspect's Questions 
Chief Justice Rehnquist would say that this analysis is unfair 
to the police. He saw nothing sinister about the "if and when 
you go to court" sentence. That information, he said, "simply 
anticipates" a question a suspect might ask: When will I ac-
tually get a lawyer? After all, the information the police sup-
plied "accurately described the procedure for the appointment 
of counsel in Indiana.'' 19 
The difficulty with this sanguine view of the matter is that 
there are a great many questions a suspect might ask the police: 
Do you have any witnesses to the crime? Did my friend con-
fess? Will I get a heavier sentence if I'm convicted later because 
I refused to ''cooperate'' with you? 
If it is the truth, may the police inform a suspect while they 
are giving him the Miranda warnings that two eyewitnesses 
have identified him as the bank robber? If it is the truth, may 
they tell a suspect between the second and third warning that 
his accomplice has "cracked" and implicated him? If it is an 
"accurate description" of the practice in that jurisdiction-and 
it may well be-may the police tell a suspect between the first 
and second warning that if he refuses to talk to them and is 
subsequently covicted he will get a heavier sentence? In each 
case, couldn't the police say that the additional information 
they provided "simply anticipated" a question the suspect 
might have asked? 
One sympathizes with a police officer who has to make a 
split-second decision: Am I justified in shooting at (or what 
appears to be) that fleeing robber in order to prevent his es-
cape ?]o Do I have sufficient grounds to arrest (or even to ''stop'') 
1 ~ ·'The warning of a right to counsel would be hollow if not couched in terms that 
would convey to the indigent ... the person most often subjected to interrogation-
the knowledge that he too has a right to have counsel present. ... [O]nly by effective 
and express explanation to the indigent of this right can there be any assurance that 
he was truly in a position to exercise it." /d. at 473. 
19 109 S. Ct. at 2880. 
20 See, e.g., Graham v. Connor, 109 S. Ct. 1865, 1872 (1989) (claims under 42 
U .S.C. § 1983 that police officer used excessive force should be analyzed under 
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that suspicious fellow lurking in an alley a block away from 
where a woman is screaming? 
But it is hard to have any sympathy for a police officer who 
tries to play fast and loose with the Miranda warnings, or a 
police department, such as Hammond's, that continues to use 
variations on the Miranda warnings a decade after these very 
formulations have been discredited by the federal court of ap-
peals for the circuit. 
An officer does not have to give the Miranda warnings until 
the situation is under control and the suspect is in custody. Nor 
does he ever have to give them unless he plans to interrogate 
the suspect. If an officer does not carry a Miranda card or know 
the Miranda warnings after all these years, what does he know? 
And if an officer is willing to give the warnings, a relatively 
simple procedure, the way they were described in Miranda, 
what other less rigid rules is he prepared to fudge? 
Are Miranda Warnings Ever "Inaccessible"? 
Chief Justice Rehnquist does not think it's nearly that sim-
ple. An officer "in the field," he notes, "may not always have 
access to printed warnings'' or may ''inadvertently depart from 
routine practice, particularly if a suspect requests an elabora-
tion of the warnings. " 21 
What bearing do these observations have on a case such as 
Duckworth where the officer was not ''in the field,'' but at 
police headquarters? What relevance do these observations 
have when, as in Duckworth, the suspect did not ask for any 
elaboration of the warnings and an entire police department 
(which composed and continued to use the challenged warn-
ings), not an individual officer, departed from the standard 
warnings? 
Moreover, and more fundamentally, what does it mean to 
say that the printed Miranda warnings may be "inaccessible"? 
One can understand how a magistrate may be inaccessible-but 
the Miranda warnings? How much effort does it take to 
Fourth Amendment's "objective reasonableness" standard rather than under the 
more generalized standard of substantive due process): ''The calculus of reasonable-
ness must embody allowance for the fact that police officers are often forced to make 
split-second judgments-in circumstances that are tense, uncertain, and rapidly 
evolving-about the amount of force that is necessary in a particular situation.'' 
21 !d. at 2879-2880. 
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memorize the warnings or, if one's memory is weak, to carry a 
Miranda card? What does a Miranda card weigh? How much 
room does it take? The Chief Justice writes as if each of the four 
warnings is inscribed on a separate heavy stone tablet and a 
given police department only has one set. 
A Fragile System 
A quarter of a century ago, on the eve of Miranda, Professor 
Edward Barrett asked: ''Is it the duty of the police to persuade 
the suspect to talk or to persuade him not to talk? They cannot 
be expected to do both.' ' 22 
Is there any doubt about what police officers think their su-
periors expect them to do? Who has ever heard of a police com-
missioner congratulating the officer in charge of a murder case 
for giving the Miranda warnings so carefully and so emphatical-
ly that the suspect asserted his rights and never said a word 
about the case? 
That is why a system, such as the one we have, that allows 
the police to obtain waivers of a person's constitutional rights 
without the presence of any disinterested observer, or any other 
objective record of the proceedings, is an inherently fragile one. 
Despite its shortcomings, such a system may work tolerably 
well-but only if the police adhere strictly to the standard 
Miranda warnings. 
If police departments or individual officers are allowed to 
"improvise," if they are permitted to "anticipate questions" a 
suspect might ask, the system will collapse. For the police will 
only "improvise" in one direction. And they will only antici-
pate questions the answers to which further their interests, not 
the suspect's. 
This must be said not because the police are more dishonest 
than the rest of us. Rather, they are no less human than the rest 
of us-no less inclined to further their own interests if given the 
leeway to do so. 
Should the Police Have Anticipated Other Questions? 
One need go no further than the Duckworth case to illustrate 
the point. The police anticipated a question the answer to which 
22 Brief of Edward L. Barrett, Jr., as amicus curiae, at 9, People v. Dorado. 62 
Cal. 2d 338, 398 P.2d 361, 42 Cal. Rptr. 169 (1965) (on rehearing). 
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could only have made it less likely that Eagan would assert his 
right to appointed counsel. But the police could have reason-
ably anticipated another question: "If, as you just told me, you 
cannot give me a lawyer now, what happens if I ask for one 
now?" 
The truthful answer to that question would have been: ''If 
you ask for a lawyer now, then we would be very restricted as 
to how we could proceed. We could have to cease questioning 
on the spot. And we could not resume questioning at a later 
time, even if we gave you a fresh set of Miranda warnings. We 
could not talk to you any more about this case unless and until 
you changed your mind about wanting a lawyer and you your-
self initiated further communication with us. " 23 
Why didn't the Hammond police anticipate that other ques-
tion? Because the answer to it would have made it more likely 
that Eagan would have asserted his right to appointed counsel. 24 
Other examples come readily to mind. A suspect may won-
der whether, if he neither writes nor signs anything, his con-
versation or small talk with the police can be used against him. 
He may very well think that it cannot be. Will his interrogators 
anticipate his confusion and uncertainty in this regard and clar-
ify the matter? Will they inform him, as the Uniform Rules of 
Criminal Procedure recommend, that anything the suspect tells 
them "orally or in writing, will be used against him"?25 Why 
would they? That would only "help" the suspect. 
A person taken into police custody may wonder whether his 
silence can be used against him. He may be asking himself most 
urgently: "How can I avoid looking guilty unless I agree to talk 
23 See generally Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477 (!981). 
24 As between the two questions that might have been anticipated, the one about 
what consequences flow from the assertion of the right to counsel is more important. 
Under the Miranda system, when a suspect gets a lawyer doesen't matter nearly as 
much as whether he asks for one. Once he does, additional safeguards are triggered-
regardless of how long it takes for a lawyer to actually become available. See Ed-
wards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477 (1981). 
The police know or ought to know that asking for a lawyer significantly reduces 
their maneuverability. Once a request for counsel is made the police must not only 
back off immediately, but they cannot try again at a later interrogation session-
unless the suspect initiates further communication with them. The last thing the 
police want a suspect to do, therefore, is to ask for a lawyer. It follows that the police 
are not eager to explain a suspect's right to appointed counsel unequivocally, plainly, 
and emphatically. If the courts do not require them to do so, why bother? 
25 Unif. R. Crim. P. 212 (b) (emphasis added). 
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to the police?" 26 Will his interrogators anticipate that question 
and inform him that if he goes to trial the prosecution will not be 
able to comment on the fact that he asserted his rights and re-
mained silent when given the Miranda wamings?27 Why would 
they? That, too, would only help the suspect. 
A suspect may be wondering whether his spouse or parents 
retained a lawyer on his behalf and whether that lawyer is trying 
to see him. The police need not give a suspect that information 
if he does not ask for it/8 but they could anticipate such ques-
tions-especially if they know a lawyer is trying to see the sus-
pect. Will they do so? Why? Providing such information would 
encourage a suspect to assert his right to counsel. What police 
interrogator worth his salt would do that? 
Suppose, as they are about to arrest a suspect and take him 
to the station house, the police overhear the suspect asking a 
friend or relative to get him a lawyer. Suppose further that no 
lawyer comes to the station house or calls the police on the 
suspect's behalf. Can the police tell the suspect that? Why not? 
Wouldn't such information anticipate a question the suspect 
might ask and wouldn't it be an "accurate description" of what 
had transpired? 
Are the police, and should the police be, free to anticipate 
questions they would like to answer and free not to anticipate 
those they would rather not answer? The Duckworth case need 
not be read that broadly, but it is certainly a giant step in that 
direction-a step the Court should have blocked. 
26 The Miranda opinion points out, 384 U.S. at 468, that many suspects will as-
sume that "silence in the face of accusation is itself damning and will bode ill when 
presented to a jury.'' The opinion then informs trial judges and prosecutors that a 
suspect's "[standing] mute or claiming his privilege in the fact of accusation" may 
not be used against him at trial. Id. at 468 n.)7. But nowhere does the Miranda 
opinion require that a law enforcement officer advise a suspect to this effect. See 
generally Elsen & Rosett, "Protections for the Suspect Under Miranda v. Arizona," 
67 Colum. L. Rev. 645, 654-655 (1967). 
. 
27 Statements obtained from a suspect in violation of Miranda may be used to 
1mpeach him if he takes the stand in his own defense. Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 
222 _(1971); Oregon v. Hass, 420 U.S. 714 (1975). Moreover, if a suspect has not been 
adv1sed of his rights, his post-arrest silence may also be used for impeachment pur-
poses. Fletcher v. Weir, 455 U.S. 603 (1982) (per curiam). But if he has been given 
the M_iran~a warnings, a suspect's silence may be used neither in the prosecution's 
case-m-ch1ef nor for impeachment purposes. 
28 ~oran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412 (1986). However, if a suspect specifically asks 
the pohce whether a lawyer is trying to reach him and the police know that one is 
this author believes the police must so inform the suspect. ' 
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Continued Use of the Challenged Warnings 
How seriously should one take the State of Indiana's con-
tention that despite the "if and when you go to court" language, 
the Hammond police warnings "in their totality" are "a fully 
effective equivalent'' of the standard warnings?29 
If this were really so, why didn't Indiana law enforcement 
officials avoid litigation by discarding this type of warning and 
reverting to the standard form? Why didn't they accept the con-
clusion of the Seventh Circuit in 1972 that the "if and when you 
go to court" language fatally taints the warning? Why did they 
persist in fighting the issue all these years? 
These questions were not easy for the state to answer. In-
deed, at one point in the oral arguments before the Supreme 
Court, Indiana's lawyer conceded that the continued use of the 
"if and when you go to court" language ''makes no sense. " 30 
One must conclude that the continued use of this offending 
language does make sense-and it .only makes sense-if it gives 
the police certain advantages not provided by the standard 
warnings. It is the state's argument-its insistence that the 
challenged formulation is essentially no different than the warn-
ings described in Miranda-that makes no sense. 
The best explanation for the failure of the Hammond police 
to abandon their version of the warnings in favor of the more 
common variety is the belief, and a well-founded one, that their 
formulation tends to confuse unsophisticated indigent suspects 
and tends to induce them to forgo the right to counsel at the 
critical moment. The Hammond police continued to use warn-
ings disapproved by the federal court of appeals for their cir-
cuit, and the state's attorneys continued to defend their use, 
because these warnings give law enforcement officials an 
advantage the Miranda Court never would have allowed-and 
because they hoped (perhaps expected) that a "new" Court, 
one not enamored of Miranda, would let them get away with it. 
Last term their hopes were fulfilled. What now? 
29 Of course the Duckworth majority bought this argument. The phrase "a fu"lly 
effective equivalent," quoted in Duckworth, comes from Miranda, 384 U.S. at 476: 
"The warnings required and the waiver necessary in accordance with our opinion 
today are, in the absence of a fully effective equivalent, prerequisites to the 
admissibility of any statement made by a defendant." 
30 See 45 Crim. L. Rep. 4009, 4010 (April 12, 1989). 
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What Message Has the Court Sent the Police? 
If a police officer wanted to minimize the impact of the 
Miranda warnings, Duckworth would exhilarate and inspire 
him. He would read the case as putting each of the four warn-
ings up for grabs. 
Many new versions of the Miranda warnings are likely to 
emerge (and some once-disapproved formulations are likely to 
resurface). To take but one example, the standard form of the 
second warning is that "anything you say can and will [or may] 
be used against you." In the years immediately following 
Miranda, however, the Philadelphia police tried to blunt the 
second warning as much as possible by advising suspects that 
anything they said could be used "for or against" them. 31 The 
state supreme court didn't let them get away with that. It in-
validated the formulation because it was ''likely to undercut the 
effect of the [Miranda] warning by offering an inducement to 
speak. " 32 
Now that Duckworth is on the books, that once-discredited 
version of the second warning (along with sundry variations of 
other warnings) is likely to appear again. Will the new Court 
uphold the old Philadelphia warning? It is no longer clear that it 
will not. After all, isn't the formulation literally true? State-
ments that suspects make to the police are not often used for 
them, but they may be-and sometimes they are. 
As has been argued here, the Hammond police sent Eagan 
the wrong message (or at least an unnecessarily confused and 
misleading one). What is far more important, however, is that, 
in upholding those "pretzel-like warnings, " 33 the Supreme 
Court sent law enforcement officers and front-line courts the 
wrong message: Don't fret too much about the wording of the 
warnings in the Miranda opinon. Don't worry. Be happy. You 
have a good deal more room to play with the warnings than 
most of you ever imagined. 
31 (Emphasis added.) See the discussion in Commonwealth v. Singleton, 439 Pa. 
185, 266 A.2d 753 (1970). 
32 266 A.2d at 756. 
33 Dissenting Justice Marshall so described the warnings given respondent Eagan 
(quoting Commonwealth v. Johnson, 484 Pa. 349, 356, 339 A.2d 111, 115 (1979) (so 
characterizing a similar warning)). · 
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